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Abstract 
Worldwide carbon dioxide emissions continue to increase driven by fossil fuel consumption 
and industrial discharges. Progress on carbon emission reduction requires firms to adopt clean 
technologies which minimize material and energy consumption. Technological change is 
particularly required in developing countries, where industrial emissions often lead to chronic 
urban pollution problems. In this study, we explore the antecedents of clean technology strategy 
by firms in developing countries. We combine the contingent natural resource based view with the 
relational view to examine how network embeddedness, market incentives and slack resources 
influence adoption of clean technology. The empirical support for our hypotheses comes from data 
obtained from 342 firms that operated in the carbon-offset market during the years 2007 to 2009. 
We find that a firm’s relational network structure influences adoption of clean technologies, 
particularly when market incentives are low. Contrary to one of the hypotheses, the results of our 
paper suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s slack resources and its clean technology 
strategy. Our study highlights the benefits of networks in fostering adoption of clean technology in 
developing countries. Furthermore, we find that high market incentives (carbon price) decrease the 
probability of clean technology adoption, so adding to the view that firms respond to carbon offset 
rules to realise high carbon revenues at the lowest cost. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) levels averaged more than 410 parts per million in April and May of 
2018, and were the highest monthly averages ever recorded (National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 2018). Worldwide CO2 emissions have been increasing driven mainly by fossil 
fuel and industry emissions (Peters et al., 2017; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2018). There is general agreement that achieving real progress and reductions on greenhouse gas 
emissions will require far-reaching technological change (Grubb, 2004). Firms, being the primary 
actors, are expected to reduce their carbon footprint by adopting clean technologies aimed at 
minimizing material and energy consumption (Hart & Dowell, 2011). Adoption of environmentally 
friendly clean technologies is particularly required in developing countries, where economic 
growth has resulted in increased emissions often leading to chronic urban pollution problems 
(Pfeiffer & Mulder, 2013). 
In line with the natural resource based view (NRBV) of the firm, ‘greening strategies’, such 
as pollution prevention, result in incremental improvement and cost savings in the short-term (Hart, 
1997; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). However, a longer-term sustainability strategy, which 
includes investment in clean technology, is necessary if economic growth is to be maintained into 
the future (Hart & Dowell, 2011). From this perspective, firms who want to better position 
themselves vis-à-vis competitors and who are motivated by future performance benefits are likely 
to invest in clean technology (Hart & Dowell, 2011; Jeswani, Wehrmeyer, & Mulugetta, 2008). 
However, as outlined by Aragón-Correa & Sharma (2003) the adoption of a clean technology 
strategy may also depend on moderating conditions or contingencies in the business environment. 
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Factors such as state and organizational effect uncertainty, complexity and munificence (the extent 
to which the business environment can sustain firm growth), are likely to hinder adoption of a clean 
technology strategy. Extant literature on the adoption of clean technology by firms in developing 
countries largely supports the contingent (natural) resource-based view, with internal as well as 
external factors found to be influential (Leonidou, Christodoulides, Kyrgidou, & Palihawadana, 
2017; Slawinski, Pinkse, Busch, & Banerjee, 2017). 
The current literature on firm adoption of clean technologies mostly considers firms as 
autonomous entities and overlooks the set of relationships that a firm has with other organizations 
(Ashraf, Meschi, & Spencer, 2014). The relational view posits that resources may span firm 
boundaries (Dyer & Singh, 1998) with external resources, to which the firm has access, embedded 
in its alliance network. The adoption of a clean technology strategy also requires resource-intensive 
innovation (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008; Frondel et al., 2007), which may be in excess of the 
resources we could reasonably expect a firm to possess, especially in a developing country context 
(Ashraf et al., 2014). Likewise, diffusion of clean technology amongst firms involves the transfer 
of information and has elements of innovation (Kemp & Volpi, 2008). Relational resources become 
even more important in developing countries (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2006), where a lack of 
institutional support systems may mean that firms rely on informal governance mechanisms 
including network embeddedness (Ashraf et al., 2014). Moreover, industrial innovation in 
developing countries has been described as highly informal (Arocena & Sutz, 2000; Pietrobelli and 
Rabellotti, 2011) with scientific knowledge and technological innovation often undervalued by 
dominant cultural patterns. Innovative strengths can remain isolated and encapsulated so making it 
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difficult for firms to build clean technologies in-house. Networks can thus enhance or provide 
capabilities that firms can access to deploy cleaner technologies since there is a lower reliance on 
in-house expertise in new technologies. However, the literature currently sheds little insight on the 
role of firm networks in the adoption of clean technologies, although it has been shown that such 
networks can affect carbon performance (Ashraf et al., 2014). 
Likewise, the contingent resource based view (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003) does not 
consider the impact of conditions in the general business environment on firm networks 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994), or the impact of network-level cooperation, communication and 
learning on firm environmental behaviour (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Jarillo, 1988). Uncertain 
business conditions or low market incentives moderates the relationship between firm resources, 
including network related resources, and the likelihood that a proactive environmental strategy will 
be adopted (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). Therefore, even firms with access to a similar set of 
financial or relational resources are unlikely to have the same strategic approach where conditions 
in the business environment differ. However, we still do not have full grasp of how these 
contingencies influence firm behaviour. 
In order to address these gaps in the literature, we build on, but also extend, the contingent 
(natural) resource-based view of the firm (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Hart, 1995; Hart & 
Dowell, 2011; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) by simultaneously engaging with the relational view 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). By cross-fertilizing these two theoretical frameworks, we explicate the role 
of firm resources and network structure on the adoption of clean technologies under uncertain 
business conditions in a developing country context. Using this combined theoretical lens, we offer 
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more clarity on the antecedents of clean technology strategy than either theoretical view can offer 
independently. Our work also contributes to the literature on the role of networks in firm climate 
change strategy (Ashraf et al., 2014). 
The empirical support for our hypotheses comes from data obtained from 342 firms that 
operated in the carbon-offset market during the observation years of 2007 to 2009. In the following 
sections, we briefly present our hypotheses to explicate the underlying mechanisms of the adoption 
of clean technologies by firms. This is followed by method and results sections. The article 
concludes by discussing the theoretical and practical implications giving directions for future 
research. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
Cross-fertilizing the relational view with the contingent natural resource based view of the 
firm as described in the previous section, we develop hypotheses to explicate the effects of firm 
resources, network, and moderating conditions, on the adoption of clean technologies. We posit 
that resources owned by the firm influence its clean technology strategy. Moreover, considering 
the institutional voids in developing countries, we expect that firms rely more on their relational 
resources and network to access and adopt clean technologies. However, this is contingent on 
general market conditions. 
2.1. Firm slack resources 
Nohria & Gulati (1996, p. 1246) define slack as “the pool of resources in an organization 
that is in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level of organizational output”. 
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While there are different types of slack, including, for example, human resources or operational 
capacity (Leyva-de la Hiz, Ferron-Vilchez, & Aragon-Correa, 2018; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & Voss, 
2008), our work follows that of researchers who focus on the availability of financial slack 
(Berrone, Fosfuri, Gelabert, & Gomez‐Mejia, 2013; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Financial slack 
can be in the form of unabsorbed cash or credit lines or may be absorbed in the form of excessive 
investments in ongoing operations. Financial slack can typically be redeployed within the firm 
without significant constraint (Voss et al., 2008). 
There are diverging views in the literature on whether absorbed and unabsorbed financial 
slack fosters firm innovation, noting that innovation is important for the adoption and diffusion of 
clean technologies (Ahuja et al., 2008; Kemp & Volpi, 2008). Several researchers highlight that 
the existence of financial slack helps in the allocation of investment to innovative projects (Leyva- 
de la Hiz et al., 2018; Damanpour, 1991) while too little slack is likely to inhibit innovation (Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996). Although investment in environmental innovation is considered to pose more risk 
(Berrone et al., 2013), research finds that companies increasingly identify environmental 
innovation as bringing long-term strategic opportunities (Huang & Li, 2017). While there is no 
guarantee that such risky investments will translate into improved financial performance (Leyva- 
de la Hiz et al., 2018), this cushion of financial resources can protect the organization in the event 
of failure (O’Brien, 2003). In contrast, firms with low levels of financial slack are more likely to 
conserve resources to ensure availability of funds to maintain ongoing activities (Voss et al., 2008). 
An alternative view in the literature is that firms use slack resources to sustain their 
operations rather than investing in innovation (Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; Voss et al., 
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2008). In such cases, firms may prefer to capitalize on established competencies rather than risk 
more innovative investments. Such resource rich firms may experience a lower motivation to 
innovate compared to those companies whose survival depends on their ability to find new ways 
to compete, since they may feel more secure about their ability to finance operations into the future 
(Lavie et al., 2010; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001) 
From the above, it is apparent that financial slack may both facilitate and mitigate 
innovation. However, an important determinant in the decision to deploy resources is the perceived 
environmental threat (Lavie et al. 2010, Voss et al., 2008). Where the current as well as the long- 
term performance of the firm is threatened, then companies with greater levels of slack are more 
likely to deploy these resources, since innovation is this context is deemed to be salient (Voss et 
al., 2008). The need to transition to a low-carbon economy can be considered an important threat 
to companies in developing countries. Developing countries are being asked to transition to low 
carbon energy sources at a faster rate than developed countries have previously done (Kim, 2018). 
The requirement for developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ in their energy transition demands the 
development and transfer of advanced technologies (Kim, 2018). Firms that do not participate in 
this energy and technology transformation are likely to struggle to compete in the longer term as 
their processes become outdated and obsolete. Research has found that, although financial return 
is an important consideration for investment in low carbon technologies by firms in developing 
countries (Schneider, 2009), policy incentives, competitive position and reputation are also 
important motivators (Hultman, Pulver, Guimarães, Deshmukh, & Kane, 2012). This implies that 
firms in developing countries also consider the broader, long-term business implications of their 
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investments. Considering this, we posit that the more slack resources a firm has, the more likely it 
will be that it will invest and adopt clean technologies. 
Hypothesis 1: In developing countries, the higher the slack resources of a firm, the higher 
the probability that it will adopt clean technologies. 
 
2.2. Embeddedness in closed networks 
 
Institutions consist of both informal constraints (customs, traditions, codes of conduct) as well 
as formal rules (laws, constitutions) which create order in market exchanges (North, 1991). 
Particularly in developing countries, institutions may be weak or absent creating institutional voids. 
These voids include a lack of rules, regulations or law enforcement, underdeveloped or absent 
infrastructure, a lack of skilled labour or poorly functioning government agencies (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997). Where institutions are weak or absent these voids generate uncertainty and barriers 
in the business environment (Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012; Webb, Kistruck, Ireland, & Ketchen 
Jr, 2010). As a case in point, the institutional environment provides the necessary support for 
fostering and developing innovation (Metcalfe & Georghiou, 1997) and research has found that 
where institutions are weak or absent then firm innovation is negatively impacted (Zhu, Wittmann, 
& Peng, 2012; Chadee & Roxas, 2013). Institutional voids in this context include weaker protection 
of property rights, low levels of research and development, and a small number of intermediaries 
that could connect research and development laboratories with the market (Khanna et al., 2006). 
Given  weak  formal  institutions,  firms  in  developing  countries  often  rely  on informal 
institutions and relational trust mechanisms (Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010) to bridge 
institutional  voids.  For  example,  in  China,  businesses  rely  strongly  on   guanxi,   which   are 
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connections or relationships based on reciprocity, to achieve their goals (Puffer et al., 2010). 
Similarly, Tariq, Badir, Tariq, & Bhutta (2017) argued that resource sharing and knowledge 
transfer through firm relational networks is important for the adoption of greening product and 
process innovation. Networks thus substitute or complement the formal institutional system in 
developing countries. 
Coleman (2000) argued that trust between firms is a function of a particular network 
configuration, that is, a closed network wherein all of a firm’s partners are connected with each 
other. Such a network ensures a social policing mechanism (Granovetter, 1985) to overcome the 
lack of trust, so giving credence to parties involved that commitments will be honoured. Where 
trust is high, firms are more likely to invest in learning and share valuable knowledge (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). A firm’s closed network can thus increase access to 
knowledge which can also foster exchange as well as transfer of technologies (Inkpen & Tsang, 
2005). Moreover, such a network enables actors to develop a common language, which facilitates 
the exchange of institutionalized routines, and tacit and proprietary knowledge, thus giving 
competitive advantages to all network members. Therefore, if a firm in a developing country is 
embedded in a closed network such that all its partners are connected with each other, institutional 
voids will be bridged. Under such circumstances, we posit that firms are likely to have access to 
knowledge and resources and so are more likely to adopt clean technologies. 
Hypothesis 2: In developing countries, the more a firm is embedded in a closed network, 
the higher the probability that it will adopt clean technologies. 
2.3. Market incentives 
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It has been argued that economic incentives are important for technological change as they 
smooth the way for companies to invest in green innovation (del Río González, 2005; Tariq et al., 
2017). Market incentives for adoption of clean technologies may include tax incentives, bank 
financing at lower rates, lower insurance premiums, and grants for research and development 
amongst others (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). The economic incentives associated with policy 
instruments, for example emission trading or carbon credits, can also be important in influencing 
investment in low carbon technologies (Wordsworth & Grubb, 2003). In the context of developing 
countries, the sale of carbon credits is likely to provide an important incentive for investment in 
clean technologies (Trotter, da Cunha, & Féres, 2015). In order to benefit from carbon credits under 
emissions trading, for instance, projects are expected to offer real emissions reductions as well as 
benefits to host countries, such as the transfer of technology and know-how (Fischer, 2005; 
Gillenwater and Seres, 2011). While in some cases it has been found that carbon credit revenues 
are just the ‘icing on the cake’ rather than the reason to undertake a clean technology project (Ellis 
& Kamel, 2007; Hultman et al., 2012) in other cases the project would not occur without carbon 
credit revenues (Schneider, 2009). 
Under uncertain business conditions with lower market incentives, one would expect an 
increase in transaction costs and risk premiums that affect major capital investments. Given that 
investments are often hinged on expected rewards, any downward trend in market incentives 
increases business uncertainty, and so can dissuade investors from adopting a clean technology 
strategy. For example, Lee and Klassen (2016) found that uncertain business conditions decrease 
the adoption of carbon management practices. Since firms are expected to increase economic 
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rewards for their stakeholders, primarily shareholders, this requires that firms focus on responding 
to market demand (Tariq et al., 2017). Therefore, if the market signals that investments in clean 
technologies can translate into higher returns, firms are expected to adopt clean technologies 
(Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). Therefore, we posit that: 
Hypothesis 3a: In developing countries, the higher the market incentives, the higher the 
probability that firms will adopt clean technologies. 
 
 
As investments can turn into higher rewards during high market growth and certainty 
(Chen, Zeng, Lin, & Ma, 2017), as signalled by high market incentives, relying on closed networks 
can become a liability. The closed network builds trust and facilitates exchange of tacit knowledge; 
however, it also reduces the possibility that firms will adopt an independent strategic posture 
(Ashraf et al., 2014). To reap short-term financial gains, control and independence over strategies 
cannot be ensured through closed networks. On the contrary, when the market is down or during 
low munificence (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003), as signalled by lower market incentives, firms 
react differently. Market uncertainty, due to variation in incentives, is external and beyond the 
control of a specific firm. Under such circumstances, we argue, firms will reinforce the embedded 
relationships (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004) so as to share the risks and develop trust. 
This banding together also means that firms can focus on long-term financial rewards, since they 
are more likely to rely on forming closed networks, trading control for trust. This is also a less 
costly strategy compared to expensive acquisition of equity stakes (Kristinsson & Rao, 2008; Deng, 
2009) with foreign partners. Therefore, we posit that: 
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Hypothesis 3b: In developing countries, the lower the market incentives, the more likely 
it will be that those firms that are embedded in closed network will adopt clean technologies. 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1. Sample and data 
 
Global climate policy relies on emissions trading to stimulate development of technologies 
for the transition to a low-carbon economy. An important component of this market is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol1, which comprises approximately 
7,700 projects with more than 1.6 billion Certified Emission Reductions (CER) issued (Cames et 
al., 2016). International market based environmental policies can create an incentive for firms in 
developing countries to invest in low-carbon technologies since this can result in financial benefit 
in the form of CER revenues as well as generating positive reputation among stakeholders 
(Hultman et al.,2012). We focus on the carbon-offset market as an empirical context. The carbon- 
offset market gives opportunities to firms in developing countries to learn, and access knowledge, 
technologies, and resources from their partners in developed countries (Ashraf, Ahmadsimab, & 
Pinkse, 2017; Ashraf et al., 2014; Huang & Barker, 2012; Kolk & Mulder, 2011). However, the 
 
 
 
 
1 The future of the CDM is uncertain after 31 December 2020, when the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment 
period ends. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement introduces a new mechanism which aims to contribute to the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and to foster sustainable development. It is unclear whether the 
CDM will be discontinued after 2020, or whether it will remain operational in parallel to the Article 6 
mechanism (UNFCCC, 2018). 
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price of carbon-offset rights influences emission reduction efforts in developing countries due to 
higher perceived risks or transaction costs. 
To test our hypotheses, we used data that was collected as part of a large research project 
to understand the social and strategic dynamics of actors’ behaviour in the carbon market during 
the years 2005 to 2010. The larger dataset comprised 1312 organizations representing 39% of the 
total organizations whose projects were registered in the CDM registry. These organizations were 
working on 1500 projects and belonged to 59 countries. The majority of firms belonged to China 
and India from the electric services and the cement industry. For this paper, due to unavailability 
of firm-level financial information, however, our sample consists of a subset of the larger dataset 
and comprises 342 firms belonging to 119 industries and 33 developing countries during the years 
2007 to 2009 in the carbon offset market. Mirroring the statistics of the larger dataset, the majority 
of firms in our sample belonged to China and India from the electric and cement industries (see 
Table 1 for details). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
The observation period of this study, although not recent, is ideal for understanding the 
behaviour of firms in the initial phase of the carbon-offset market during uncertain business 
conditions. Considering that many countries have started local and regional emission trading 
markets only recently, our study may provide empirical evidence to understand climate change 
strategies of firms during the institutionalization phase of carbon markets. The period of our sample 
2007-2009 also encompasses the period between phase I & phase II of the EU Emissions Trading 
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Scheme (EU ETS), an important period which saw considerable market volatility. In 2007, and so 
towards the end of phase I, as a result of a market surplus, EU allowance (EUA) spot prices fell to 
1€/tCO2 and ended 2007 at 0.02 €t/CO2 (Alberola & Chevallier, 2009). In phase II, EUA prices 
reached a high of €28 by July 2008 (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2008; Mansanet-Bataller, Chevallier, 
Hervé-Mignucci, & Alberola, 2011), but the economic downturn later that year resulted in reduced 
demand, and carbon prices declined by almost 75% over a period of just a few months (Capoor & 
Ambrosi, 2009). By February 2009, EUAs were priced at €8 (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011) and 
by May of that year, prices had stabilized in the region of €13 to €16 (Kossoy & Ambrosi, 2010). 
Between mid-2009 and July 2011, prices remained stable but then dropped substantially (Silver, 
2015). Between 2011 and 2017, EUAs were priced between €3 and €9 while CER prices 
plummeted and were worth less than €1 (World Bank Group, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). Therefore, 
the period of our study from 2007 to 2009 represents a unique period in the history of the EU ETS 
where both very low (<€1) as well as record high (€28 for EUA/ €22 for CER) market incentives 
were present within a condensed period of time. The carbon market data was obtained from the 
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies2 and CDM Pipeline3. Financial data of the firms in 
the network were obtained from MINTGLOBAL4 database. 
3.2. Variables 
 
 
 
 
2 CDM Project data can be accessed from Institute of Global Environmental Strategies from this address: 
https://pub.iges.or.jp/pub/iges-cdm-project-database. 
3 Complete historical record and analysis of the CDM market can obtained from this address: 
http://www.cdmpipeline.org/ 
4 Mintglobal (https://mintglobal.bvdinfo.com) is a proprietary database and contains financial information about the 
private and publicly listed firms. 
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We computed the dependent variable adoption of clean technologies as a proportion of 
renewable energy (biogas, biomass, wind, and hydro) projects of a firm in its carbon-offset projects 
portfolio during the observation years. There were three motivating reasons for selecting this proxy. 
First, this variable captures firm commitment to wean off non-renewable technologies and reduce 
its carbon footprint by exploring and investing in sustainable energy (Ashraf et al., 2017). 
Secondly, the variable signals a socio-technical shift in firm approach towards sustainability 
(Geels, 2010). Finally, firm carbon management practices are ranked highly by the market, and 
are considered as an indicator of environmental performance. Flammer (2013), for example, 
operationalized environmental performance using the KLD5 index which gives considerable 
weight to firms’ usage of renewable energy. 
The slack resources of a firm influence its climate change strategy (Chen et al., 2017), as 
discussed above. We followed the existing literature (Waddock & Graves, 1997), and used the 
financial performance indicator - return on assets - as a proxy for slack resources. 
To compute network embeddedness, we extracted two-mode network (firm working on 
CDM projects) from the CDM project database. Following Ashraf et al. (2014), we transformed 
two-mode affiliation network (firms x project) into one-mode adjacency matrices (firms x firms). 
Using these matrices, we computed network constraint as a proxy of network embeddedness. This 
variable measures the degree to which partners of a focal firm are connected with each other 
 
 
5 KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini) is an independent ratings service which assesses firm performance across a 
range of social and environmental dimensions related to stakeholder concerns. 
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(Ashraf et al., 2014). The higher values indicate more embeddedness in closed network. We used 
UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) to compute this measure. 
If a firm in a developing country invests in renewable energy technology to benefit from 
the carbon-offset credit revenues that such an investment can generate (Ashraf et al., 2014), a drop 
in the carbon price may increase apprehension and uncertainty about the viability of recouping the 
investment, at least in the short-term. The carbon price in the market signals whether and how much 
the market will reward the effort of firms to perform sustainably by investing in clean technologies. 
We therefore took the carbon prices of emission rights as a proxy for market incentives. Following 
Ashraf et al. (2014), we took an average of the spot prices of European emission allowances, that 
is, the base price used for the CDM market, for the observation years 2007 to 2009. Data was 
obtained from Bluenext –European Emissions Exchange. 
We also controlled for the effects of a firm’s social status, and measured this variable by 
computing eigenvector centrality of focal firms following Mathis (2007), using UCINET (Borgatti 
et al., 2002). The eigenvector centrality gives higher scores to those firms that are connected with 
more central actors. Moreover, we also controlled for normative pressure - the influence of 
consultants and auditors in the carbon market (Kolk & Mulder, 2011) on the clean technology 
strategy of firms. These intermediaries act as important actors to affect the norms in an institutional 
field. We measured this variable by computing the ratio of professional auditing and consultancy 
firms with whom focal firms were working in a given year. For this purpose, we first counted the 
number of professional intermediaries of focal firms and divided it by the total number of CDM 
projects of focal firms. We also controlled for the effects of scale of investments (by computing the 
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proportion of a firm’s large-scale projects divided by the total number of projects) on the firm’s 
clean technology strategy. In addition, firm age was used to control for the effect of new capital 
resources and experience in business, and was computed by deducting firm founding year from the 
year under observation. Moreover, we computed two variables: network size and experience of 
firms in the CDM market and used these variables as instruments to check the robustness of our 
models to potential endogeneity problems. Network size was computed using UCINET 6 (Borgatti 
et al., 2002) by counting the number of focal firm project partners in a given year. Experience of 
firms in the CDM market was measured by computing the ratio of their registered CDM projects 
(total number of registered projects divided by total number of conceived, under-process, or 
rejected projects). 
 
 
4. Model estimation & results 
 
Our dependent variable – adoption of clean technologies6 - contained the values of 0 or 1, 
therefore we estimated the model with probit regression (Papke & Wooldridge, 2008). 
Furthermore, we standardized the variables so that coefficients could be compared. We estimated 
models stepwise: we first introduced control variables, followed by main predictors, and interaction 
terms. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables, and Table 3 
shows the results. Table 2 shows significant correlations between some variables, however, we did 
 
 
6 The dependent variable was a proportion, however, there were only 15 observations that lay between 0 and 1. We 
thus dropped these observations to avoid bias in the estimation. 
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not find the issue of multi-collinearity as variance inflation factors (VIF) for all the variables were 
found to be below the tolerance level of 10 (Ashraf et al., 2014). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Compared to the base model 1 (AIC=755.32; pseudo R2=0.137; p<0.01), the fitness of the 
models improves when we introduce main predictors, with the exception of model 2 (AIC=757.31; 
pseudo R2=0.137; p<0.01). The final model 5, with all the main predictors and interaction effect, 
is the optimal model (AIC=624.01; pseudo R2=0.165; p<0.01). 
The results (see model 2, Table 3) show that the probability of adopting clean technology 
decreases when firm slack resources are high (β= -0.01, p > 0.10). The negative sign of the 
coefficient contradicts our hypothesis 1, however the effect is not found to be statistically 
significant. The results (see model 3, Table 3) also show the positive, and statistically significant, 
effect of network embeddedness (β= 0.189, p < 0.05) supporting hypothesis 2. We also find that 
market incentives (see model 4, Table 3) negatively affect the probability of adopting clean 
technology (β= -0.122, p < 0.1), contradicting hypothesis 3a. 
The results show that, when market incentives are low, firms that are more embedded in 
closed networks (see model 5, Table 3) have a higher probability of adopting a clean technology 
strategy (β= -0.210, p < 0.01). This confirms hypothesis 3b, that is, the lower the market incentives, 
the more likely it is that firms will use their relational network resources, and consequently the 
higher  the  probability that firms will reduce emissions through  renewable  energy technologies. 
This is further confirmed through interaction plot (refer to Figure 1), which shows that firm network 
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embeddedness increases the probability of adopting clean technology when market incentives are 
low. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
The final model 5 shows that a firm’s social status (β= 0.164, p < 0.1) is also a significant 
predictor of its clean technology strategy. 
To confirm that results are robust to potential endogeneity that may arise due to correlations 
of clean technology strategy and network embeddedness with the error term, we estimated models 
with instrument variable probit regression. For this purpose, we used two instruments – firm’s 
experience in the CDM market, and network size. The validity of instruments were confirmed 
through Amemiya-Lee-Newey over-identification test (χ2 = 0.499, p > 0.1), and Wald tests (χ2 = 
1.71, p > 0.1) of weak instruments7. The results of Wald test of exogeneity (χ2= 0.38, p > 0.1) 
showed that network embeddedness is not endogenous. Furthermore, to rule out the possibility of 
reverse causality, that is, firm’s climate change strategy may affect its networks i.e. network 
embeddedness, and social status, we followed Ashraf et al. (2014) and ran Granger causality tests. 
The results show that firm clean technology strategy does not granger cause network embeddedness 
(χ2 =2.07, p > 0.1), or social status (χ2 =0.01, p > 0.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 The tests are available through overid and weakiv functions in STATA 
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5. Discussion & conclusion 
 
Our paper contributes to, and extends, the contingent (natural) resource based view of the 
firm by cross-fertilizing it with the relational view to explain the adoption of clean technology 
strategy. We argue that although the contingent resource based view is a dominant paradigm to 
explain firm environmental strategy (Walls, Phan, & Berrone, 2011), its assumption is that value- 
creating resources are owned and controlled by the focal firm (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). While 
the contingent (natural) resource-based view (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003) takes into 
consideration external factors in the business environment that are likely to inhibit the adoption of 
a clean technology strategy, the influence of these factors on a firm’s network structure, and the 
consequences for firm behaviour, is not explicated fully. The relational view of the firm (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998), on the other hand, takes the effect of a firm’s relational network into account. 
However, the relational view of the firm alone also does not adequately capture all of the underlying 
mechanisms and moderating conditions that can affect firm environmental strategy. For example, 
its focus is not on the consequences of resources that firms own a priori. By extending the 
contingent resource based view and combining it with the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998), 
we offer more clarity to explicate the antecedents of clean technology strategy than either 
theoretical view can offer independently. 
The results show that a firm’s relational network structure influences its climate change 
strategy to reduce emissions through renewable energy or clean technologies, particularly when 
market incentives are low. Contrary to one of the hypotheses and the existing literature (Chih, Chih, 
& Chen, 2010), the results of our paper suggest a negative relationship between a firm’s slack 
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resources and its clean technology strategy. However, this effect is not found to be statistically 
significant but indicates that firm-owned financial resources are not sufficient to explain adoption 
of clean technology in developing country firms. 
Our study also provides useful insights into whether market incentives influence a firm’s 
strategy to invest in clean technologies. In the carbon-offset market context, lower market 
incentives increase uncertainty about the viability of investments. Uncertainty in the carbon market 
has also been argued to impede investment in clean technologies (Jeswani et al., 2008). In 
contradiction to this and our hypothesis, we find that higher market incentives decrease the 
probability of adopting a clean technology strategy. We conjecture that this happens because higher 
market incentives influence firm strategy in the carbon-offset market to reap financial rewards in 
the short-term through quick fixes, instead of investing in risky and capital-intensive clean 
technologies (Slawinski et al., 2017). This finding is also consistent with previous research in the 
context of HFC-23 emissions under the CDM, which shows that firms actively respond to CDM 
rules in order to benefit from high carbon revenues at the lowest cost (Schneider, 2011). Thus our 
study is in line with the literature that highlights concerns about the CDM’s ability to promote 
sustainable development (Olsen, 2007). These concerns now feature in debates about new market 
mechanisms proposed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (Schneider & La Hoz Theuer, 2018). 
We also find that, in the case of low market incentives, which increase business uncertainty 
in the carbon market, firms can benefit from their closed network and can potentially gain a 
competitive advantage by adopting a proactive strategy (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). We thus 
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refine current understanding on the impact of market incentives on firm clean technology strategy 
by focusing on the benefit of networks. 
Notwithstanding the normative concerns about the carbon-offset market as an effective 
policy response, the literature often overlooks an important point. That is, energy intensive 
practices are hard to change, and need a sufficient mass of actors, institutions and an incentive 
mechanism to correct the market anomaly of externalizing the social cost. Through this paper, we 
offer a different perspective about the efficacy of carbon markets in bringing about a positive 
change in firm’s behaviour in terms of shifting to sustainable sources of energy, which in itself 
could be considered a major shift in the way firms operate (Klein, 2014; Geels, 2010). 
Our study has important implications for policy makers. Market incentives are currently a 
critical area of concern. Policy makers consider that a high carbon price provides a positive 
incentive for long-term investment in low carbon and clean technologies. It has been estimated that 
carbon should be priced in the region of $40 - $80/ tonne in order to achieve the temperature goal 
set by the Paris Agreement (World Bank Group, 2018). However, slow demand and low carbon 
prices on the EU market is predicted to continue to 2020 (Redmond & Convery, 2015). Our 
research shows market incentives alone may not be the answer. We find that even where market 
incentives are relatively low, those firms embedded in a closed network are more likely to adopt 
clean technology. Thus, in order to stimulate adoption of low carbon technologies in the current 
environment of the carbon market, we recommend that policy makers focus on initiatives and 
programmes to facilitate partnerships between actors on the carbon market as well as creating 
opportunities for knowledge sharing and learning amongst networks of companies. Likewise, 
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where capital grants or other incentives to develop low carbon or clean technologies are available, 
these should also be offered to networks of firms rather than being confined to individual 
organizations. 
Our work also provides interesting avenues for future research. As discussed, our results 
are consistent with the view that networks are important for adoption and diffusion of innovation 
since they allow information and knowledge to be exchanged across firm boundaries (Robertson, 
Swan, & Newell, 1996). While in this paper we have concentrated on the role of firm network 
embeddedness, it would also be interesting to explore how the nature of ties between network 
partners may be influential in this process. For example, less formal networks such as 
collaborations with universities or professional associations may also be important for clean 
technology diffusion in this context (Swan & Newell, 1995). Similarly, the nature of ties between 
actors may be influential. ‘Weak ties’ among different social groups have been argued to be 
important for the diffusion of new ideas (Granovetter, 1983). At the level of the firm, this would 
suggest that more distant or informal contact with other organizations, perhaps in different industry 
sectors, may also be important for the diffusion of new ideas or new technologies (Robertson et al., 
1996). These areas may provide interesting opportunities to advance research in this area. 
The study has some limitations that may be addressed in future research. The slack 
resources of firms may signal possession of idiosyncratic resources, however, we could not account 
for the effects of complementary resources and capabilities of firms due to unavailability of such 
information. Notably, in our study we focus on a particular form of financial slack, ‘return on 
assets’; however other dimensions of financial slack were not explored due to lack of information 
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availability. The adoption of clean technologies by firms in the face of the increasing urgency of 
the climate change problem is painfully slow, and while our research is an early attempt to 
understand the antecedents of a clean technology strategy of firms in a developing country context, 
there is much more to do in this area. Firstly, our panel data was small and not contemporary; but 
as technology continues to evolve with renewable energy technology becoming more cost 
effective, it would be interesting to consider, using a larger dataset, whether this technological 
evolution is accompanied by greater adoption of clean technology by companies. Secondly, we did 
not compare and contrast antecedents of clean technology strategy of developing country firms 
with those of developed countries. Such a comparison, in future research, would clarify the 
differences between firm strategies in different institutional contexts. Finally, in terms of market 
incentives, we considered the role of carbon prices. However, it may also be interesting to consider 
the consequences of changes in the price of fossil fuels or energy generated thereof, and the effects 
of government subsidies and tax-rebates on firm’s clean technology strategy. 
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Table 1: Sample Statistics 
Total number of firms in the sample 342 
Number of industries firms belong to: 119 
% of major industries in the sample 
Electric Services 19.76 
Cement, Hydraulic 12.09 
Chemicals 3.54 
% of industry with highest number of- 
renewable energy projects 
Electric Services 36.84 
Number of countries firms belong to: 33 
% of majority in the sample 
India 36.36 
China 35.48 
Brazil 3.52 
% of countries with highest number of 
renewable energy projects 
India 42.11 
China 29.82 
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Table 2: Correlations and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
ean 
 
.D. 
 
in. 
 
ax. 
         
 Adoption 
of clean 
technologies 
 
.23 
 
.42 
           
 Market 
incentives 
 
.01 
 
.54 
 
.02 
 
4.25 
 
0.10** 
-         
 Network 
embeddedness 
 
.01 
 
.22 
 
.1 
 
.218 
 
.06† 
 
.03 
       
  
status 
Social  
.11 
 
.46 
  
.03 
 
.11** 
 
0.01 
 
.05 
      
 Slack 
resources 
 
.01 
 
.49 
 
78.61 
 
1.3 
 
0.02 
-  
.04 
 
0.19** 
-  
.01 
     
  
pressure 
Normative  
.41 
 
.48 
   
.15** 
 
.23** 
 
0.13** 
-  
0.05† 
 
.29** 
    
 Scale of 
investments 
 
.43 
 
.49 
   
.08** 
 
.24* 
 
.08* 
 
.02 
 
.11** 
 
.38** 
   
 
Firm age 
 
5.84 
 
5.24 
  
55 
 
0.06† 
-  
.01 
 
.04 
 
0.07* 
 
.07* 
 
.03 
 
0.004 
  
 Firm 
CDM experience 
 
.03 
 
.15 
   
.01 
 
.04* 
 
.10* 
 
.02 
 
0.06† 
 
0.13** 
-  
.08** 
 
.05† 
 
 
0 
 
size 
Network  
.65 
 
.17 
  
2 
 
.004 
 
.08* 
 
0.77** 
-  
.03 
 
.12** 
 
.13** 
 
.12** 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, †p<0.10 
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Table 3: Results of Probit Regression Predicting the 
Adoption of Clean Technologies 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4 Model 5 
 
Slack resources 
  
-0.01 
   
-0.056 
  (0.07)   (0.081) 
Network embeddedness   0.189**  0.287*** 
   (0.093)  (0.108) 
Market incentives    -0.122* -0.345*** 
    (0.063) (0.073) 
Network embeddedness x Market incentives     -0.210*** 
     (0.069) 
Normative pressure 0.259*** 0.260*** -0.012 0.287*** 0.005 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.086) (0.081) (0.091) 
Scale of investment 0.202** 0.202** -0.088 0.225** -0.094 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.097) (0.089) (0.101) 
Firm age -0.107 -0.106 -0.118 -0.100 -0.090 
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.117) (0.113) (0.120) 
Social status 0.293*** 0.293*** 0.197** 0.293*** 0.164* 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.090) (0.108) (0.092) 
Constant -1.101 -1.098 -0.547 -1.043 -0.177 
 (0.840) (0.841) (0.846) (0.858) (0.876) 
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.137 0.114 0.142 0.165 
AIC 755.324 757.310 647.409 753.620 624.013 
Observations 611 611 457 611 457 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Industry and country dummies are included in the models but their 
coefficients are not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Figure 1: Effect of market incentives on the relationship between firm’s network 
embeddedness and adoption of clean technologies 
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